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Abstract
We study the choice of strategic variables by ﬁrms in a duopoly in which
two ﬁrms produce diﬀerentiated substitutable goods and each ﬁrm maxi-
mizes its relative proﬁt that is the diﬀerence between its proﬁt and the proﬁt
of the rival ﬁrm. We consider a two stage game such that in the ﬁrst stage the
ﬁrms choose their strategic variables and in the second stage they determine
the values of their strategic variables. We show that when the ﬁrms maxi-
mize their relative proﬁts, the choice of strategic variables is irrelevant to the
outcome of the game in the sense that the equilibrium outputs, prices and
proﬁts of the ﬁrms are the same in all situations, and so any combination of
strategy choice by the ﬁrms constitutes a sub-game perfect equilibrium in the
two stage game. We assume that demand functions for the goods are sym-
metric and linear, the marginal costs of the ﬁrms are common and constant,
and the ﬁxed costs are zero.
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1 Introduction
We study the choice of strategic variables by ﬁrms in a duopoly in which two ﬁrms
produce diﬀerentiated substitutable goods and each ﬁrm maximizes its relative
proﬁt that is the diﬀerence between its proﬁt and the proﬁt of the rival ﬁrm. We
consider a two stage game such that in the ﬁrst stage the ﬁrms choose their strategic
variables, price or quantity, and in the second stage they determine the values of
their strategic variables. We show that when the ﬁrms maximize their relative
proﬁts, the choice of strategic variables is irrelevant to the outcome of the game in
the sense that the equilibrium outputs, prices and proﬁts of the ﬁrms are the same
in all situations, and so any combination of strategy choice by the ﬁrms constitutes
a sub-game perfect equilibrium in the two stage game. We assume that demand
functions for the goods are symmetric and linear, the marginal costs of the ﬁrms
are common and constant, and the ﬁxed costs are zero.
In recent years, maximizing relative proﬁt instead of absolute proﬁt has aroused
the interest of economists. From an evolutionary perspective, Schaﬀer (1989)
demonstrates with a Darwinian model of economic natural selection that if ﬁrms
have market power, proﬁt-maximizers are not necessarily the best survivors. Ac-
cording to Schaﬀer (1989), a unilateral deviation from Cournot equilibrium de-
creases the proﬁt of the deviator, but decreases the other ﬁrm’s proﬁt even more.
On the condition of being better than other competitors, ﬁrms that deviate from
Cournot equilibrium achieve higher payoﬀs than the payoﬀs they receive under
Cournot equilibrium. In Vega-Redondo (1997), it is argued that, under a general
equilibrium framework, if ﬁrms maximize relative proﬁt, a Walrasian equilibrium
can be induced.
On the other hand, Lundgren (1996) shows that by making managerial com-
pensation depend on relative proﬁts rather than absolute proﬁts, the incentives
for oligopoly collusion can be eliminated. Kockesen et. al.(2000) have shown
that under some conditions a ﬁrm which strives to maximize relative proﬁt will
outperform a ﬁrm which maximizes absolute proﬁt. Bolton and Ockenfels (2000)
conducted an analysis considering an individual utility function that brings about a
feeling of compassion toward an individual with a relatively lower material payoﬀ
and simultaneously brings about envy of other individuals with a higher material
payoﬀ.
As demonstrated by Matsumura, Matsushima and Cato (2009) evaluations of
managers' performances are often based on their relative performance. Outper-
forming managers often obtain good positions in the management job markets.
And the spiteful behavior as well as reciprocal behavior or altruistic behavior is
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closely related to the objective functions based on relative performance. The use
of relative performance evaluation has been empirically supported by Gibbons and
Murphy (1990).
In another unpublished paper Tanaka (2013) we have shown that in a duopoly
with diﬀerentiated goods under linear demand functions when ﬁrms maximize
relative proﬁts, a Cournot equilibrium and a Bertrand equilibrium coincide. The
result of this paper is an extension of that result.
In Section 3 we consider a case of absolute proﬁt maximization, and in Section
4 we consider a case of relative proﬁt maximization.
2 The model
There are two ﬁrms, A and B. They produce diﬀerentiated substitutable goods.
Notation is as follows.
𝑥𝐴: Output of Firm A
𝑥𝐵: Output of Firm B
𝑝𝐴: Price of the good of Firm A
𝑝𝐵: Price of the good of Firm B
The marginal costs of the ﬁrms are common, and equal 𝑐 > 0. There is no
ﬁxed cost.
The inverse demand functions of the goods produced by the ﬁrms are
𝑝𝐴 = 𝑎 − 𝑥𝐴 − 𝑏𝑥𝐵, (1)
and
𝑝𝐵 = 𝑎 − 𝑥𝐵 − 𝑏𝑥𝐴, (2)
where 𝑎 > 𝑐 and 0 < 𝑏 < 1. 𝑥𝐴 represents the demand for the good of Firm A,
and 𝑥𝐵 represents the demand for the good of Firm B. The prices of the goods are
determined so that demand of consumers for each ﬁrm's good and supply of each
ﬁrm are equilibrated.
The ordinary demand functions for the goods of the ﬁrms are obtained from
these inverse demand functions as follows,
𝑥𝐴 =
1
1 − 𝑏2 [(1 − 𝑏)𝑎 − 𝑝𝐴 + 𝑏𝑝𝐵],
and
𝑥𝐵 =
1
1 − 𝑏2 [(1 − 𝑏)𝑎 − 𝑝𝐵 + 𝑏𝑝𝐴].
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From (2) we have
𝑥𝐵 = 𝑎 − 𝑝𝐵 − 𝑏𝑥𝐴. (3)
Substituting this into (1) yields
𝑝𝐴 = (1 − 𝑏)𝑎 − (1 − 𝑏2)𝑥𝐴 + 𝑏𝑝𝐵. (4)
(3) is the ordinary demand function for Firm B and (4) is the inverse demand func-
tion for Firm A when Firm A is a quantity setting ﬁrm and Firm B is a price setting
ﬁrm. They are used in the next section.
We consider a two stage game. In the ﬁrst stage the ﬁrms choose their strategic
variables, price or quantity, and in the second stage they determine the values of
their strategic variables.
3 Absolute proﬁt maximization
In this section for reference we consider a case of absolute proﬁt maximization.
In this case each ﬁrm determines its strategic variable given the value of the rival
ﬁrm's strategic variable so as to maximize their absolute proﬁts.
3.1 Price-quantity competition
Assume that in the ﬁrst stage of the game Firm A chooses the quantity, and Firm
B chooses the price as their strategic variables. Using (4) the proﬁt of Firm A is
written as
𝜋𝐴 = [(1 − 𝑏)𝑎 − (1 − 𝑏2)𝑥𝐴 + 𝑏𝑝𝐵]𝑥𝐴 − 𝑐𝑥𝐴.
And, using (3), the proﬁt of Firm B is written as
𝜋𝐵 = (𝑎 − 𝑝𝐵 − 𝑏𝑥𝐴)(𝑝𝐵 − 𝑐).
Firm A determines its output given the price of the good of Firm B, and Firm
B determines the price of its good given the output of the good of Firm A so as to
maximize their proﬁts. The condition for proﬁt maximization of Firm A is
(1 − 𝑏)𝑎 − 2(1 − 𝑏2)𝑥𝐴 + 𝑏𝑝𝐵 − 𝑐 = 0.
And the condition for proﬁt maximization of Firm B is
𝑎 − 2𝑝𝐵 − 𝑏𝑥𝐴 + 𝑐 = 0.
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From these conditions the equilibrium output of Firm A is obtained as follows,
𝑥𝐴 =
(2 − 𝑏)(𝑎 − 𝑐)
4 − 3𝑏2 .
And the equilibrium price of the good of Firm A is
𝑝𝐵 =
(2 + 𝑏)(1 − 𝑏)𝑎 + (2 + 𝑏 − 2𝑏2)𝑐
4 − 3𝑏2
From (3) the equilibrium output of Firm B is derived as follows,
𝑥𝐵 = 𝑎 − 𝑝𝐵 − 𝑏𝑥𝐴 =
(2 + 𝑏)(1 − 𝑏)(𝑎 − 𝑐)
4 − 3𝑏2 ,
and from (1) the equilibrium price of the good of Firm A is
𝑝𝐴 = 𝑎 − 𝑥𝐴 − 𝑏𝑥𝐵 =
(1 − 𝑏2)(2 − 𝑏)𝑎 + (2 + 𝑏 − 𝑏2 − 𝑏3)
4 − 3𝑏2 .
Denote the proﬁts of Firm A (quantity setting ﬁrm) and B (price setting ﬁrm)
by 𝜋∗𝐴 and 𝜋∗𝐵. Then,
𝜋∗𝐴 =
(2 − 𝑏)2(1 − 𝑏2)(𝑎 − 𝑐)2
(4 − 3𝑏2)2 ,
and
𝜋∗𝐵 = [
(2 + 𝑏)(1 − 𝑏)(𝑎 − 𝑐)
4 − 3𝑏2 ]
2
.
Interchanging A and B, we can obtain the outcome of the second stage of the
two stage game when Firm A is a price setting ﬁrm and Firm B is a quantity setting
ﬁrm. The equilibrium proﬁts of Firm A and B in that situation are
𝜋∗∗𝐴 = [
(2 + 𝑏)(1 − 𝑏)(𝑎 − 𝑐)
4 − 3𝑏2 ]
2
,
and
𝜋∗∗𝐵 =
(2 − 𝑏)2(1 − 𝑏2)(𝑎 − 𝑐)2
(4 − 3𝑏2)2 .
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3.2 Price-price competition
Assume that both ﬁrms choose the price as their strategic variables. Then, the
proﬁts of Firm A and B are
𝜋𝐴 =
1
1 − 𝑏2 [(1 − 𝑏)𝑎 − 𝑝𝐴 + 𝑏𝑝𝐵](𝑝𝐴 − 𝑐),
and
𝜋𝐵 =
1
1 − 𝑏2 [(1 − 𝑏)𝑎 − 𝑝𝐵 + 𝑏𝑝𝐴](𝑝𝐵 − 𝑐).
The conditions for proﬁt maximization of Firm A and B are
(1 − 𝑏)𝑎 − 2𝑝𝐴 + 𝑏𝑝𝐵 + 𝑐 = 0,
and
(1 − 𝑏)𝑎 − 2𝑝𝐵 + 𝑏𝑝𝐴 + 𝑐 = 0.
The equilibrium prices and outputs are
𝑝𝐴 = 𝑝𝐵 =
(1 − 𝑏)𝑎 + 𝑐
2 − 𝑏 ,
and
𝑥𝐴 = 𝑥𝐵 =
𝑎 − 𝑐
(2 − 𝑏)(1 + 𝑏).
Denote the proﬁts of Firm A and B in this case by ̂𝜋𝐴 and ̂𝜋𝐵. Then,
̂𝜋𝐴 = ̂𝜋𝐵 =
(1 − 𝑏)(𝑎 − 𝑐)2
(2 − 𝑏)2(1 + 𝑏).
3.3 Quantity-quantity competition
Assume that both ﬁrms choose the quantity as their strategic variables. Then, the
proﬁts of Firm A and B are
𝜋𝐴 = (𝑎 − 𝑥𝐴 − 𝑏𝑥𝐵)𝑥𝐴 − 𝑐𝑥𝐴,
and
𝜋𝐴 = (𝑎 − 𝑥𝐵 − 𝑏𝑥𝐴)𝑥𝐵 − 𝑐𝑥𝐵.
The conditions for proﬁt maximization of Firm A and B are
𝑎 − 2𝑥𝐴 − 𝑏𝑥𝐵 − 𝑐 = 0,
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and
𝑎 − 2𝑥𝐵 − 𝑏𝑥𝐴 − 𝑐 = 0.
The equilibrium outputs and prices are
𝑥𝐴 = 𝑥𝐵 =
𝑎 − 𝑐
2 + 𝑏,
and
𝑝𝐴 = 𝑝𝐵 =
𝑎 + (1 + 𝑏)𝑐
2 + 𝑏 .
Denote the proﬁts of Firm A and B in this case by ̄𝜋𝐴 and ̄𝜋𝐵. Then,
̄𝜋𝐴 = ̄𝜋𝐵 = (
𝑎 − 𝑐
2 + 𝑏)
2
.
3.4 Choice of strategic variables
Comparing 𝜋∗𝐴 with ̂𝜋𝐴,
𝜋∗𝐴 − ̂𝜋𝐴 =
(2 − 𝑏)2(1 − 𝑏2)(𝑎 − 𝑐)2
(4 − 3𝑏2)2 −
(1 − 𝑏)(𝑎 − 𝑐)2
(2 − 𝑏)2(1 + 𝑏)
= [
2 − 𝑏
4 − 3𝑏2 +
1
(2 − 𝑏)(1 + 𝑏)] [
2 − 𝑏
4 − 3𝑏2 −
1
(2 − 𝑏)(1 + 𝑏)] (1 − 𝑏
2)(𝑎 − 𝑐)2
= [
2 − 𝑏
4 − 3𝑏2 +
1
(2 − 𝑏)(1 + 𝑏)]
𝑏3
(2 − 𝑏)(1 + 𝑏)(4 − 3𝑏2) (1 − 𝑏
2)(𝑎 − 𝑐)2 > 0.
Comparing ̄𝜋𝐵 with 𝜋∗𝐵,
̄𝜋𝐵 − 𝜋∗𝐵 = (
𝑎 − 𝑐
2 + 𝑏)
2
− [
(2 + 𝑏)(1 − 𝑏)(𝑎 − 𝑐)
4 − 3𝑏2 ]
2
= [
1
2 + 𝑏 +
(2 + 𝑏)(1 − 𝑏)
4 − 3𝑏2 ] [
1
2 + 𝑏 −
(2 + 𝑏)(1 − 𝑏)
4 − 3𝑏2 ] (𝑎 − 𝑐)
2
= [
1
2 + 𝑏 +
(2 + 𝑏)(1 − 𝑏)
4 − 3𝑏2 ] [
𝑏3
(2 + 𝑏)(4 − 3𝑏2)] (𝑎 − 𝑐)
2 > 0.
Similarly we have
𝜋∗∗𝐵 > ̂𝜋𝐵, and ̄𝜋𝐴 > 𝜋∗∗𝐴 .
These results imply that in the ﬁrst stage of the game the quantity strategy is a
dominant strategy for the ﬁrms. Therefore, at the sub-game perfect equilibrium of
the two stage game both ﬁrms choose the quantity as their strategic variables.
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4 Relative proﬁt maximization
In this section we consider a case of relative proﬁt maximization. We denote the
relative proﬁt of Firm A by Π𝐴 and that of Firm B by Π𝐵.
4.1 Price-quantity competition
Assume that in the ﬁrst stage of the game Firm A chooses the quantity, and Firm
B chooses the price as their strategic variables. The relative proﬁt of Firm A (or
B) is the diﬀerence between its proﬁt and the proﬁt of Firm B (or A). Using (3)
and (4), Π𝐴 and Π𝐵 are written as
Π𝐴 = 𝜋𝐴 − 𝜋𝐵
= [(1 − 𝑏)𝑎 − (1 − 𝑏2)𝑥𝐴 + 𝑏𝑝𝐵]𝑥𝐴 − 𝑐𝑥𝐴 − (𝑎 − 𝑝𝐵 − 𝑏𝑥𝐴)(𝑝𝐵 − 𝑐),
and
Π𝐵 = 𝜋𝐵 − 𝜋𝐴
= (𝑎 − 𝑝𝐵 − 𝑏𝑥𝐴)(𝑝𝐵 − 𝑐) − [(1 − 𝑏)𝑎 − (1 − 𝑏2)𝑥𝐴 + 𝑏𝑝𝐵]𝑥𝐴 + 𝑐𝑥𝐴.
Firm A determines its output given the price of the good of Firm B, and Firm
B determines the price of its good given the output of Firm A so as to maximize
their relative proﬁts. The condition for relative proﬁt maximization of Firm A is
(1 − 𝑏)𝑎 − 2(1 − 𝑏2)𝑥𝐴 + 𝑏𝑝𝐵 − 𝑐 + 𝑏(𝑝𝐵 − 𝑐)
= (1 − 𝑏)𝑎 − (1 + 𝑏)𝑐 − 2(1 − 𝑏2)𝑥𝐴 + 2𝑏𝑝𝐵 = 0. (5)
And the condition for relative proﬁt maximization of Firm B is
𝑎 − 2𝑝𝐵 − 𝑏𝑥𝐴 + 𝑐 − 𝑏𝑥𝐴 = 𝑎 − 2𝑝𝐵 − 2𝑏𝑥𝐴 + 𝑐 = 0. (6)
From (5) and (6) we obtain the equilibrium output of Firm A as follows,
𝑥𝐴 =
𝑎 − 𝑐
2 .
And the equilibrium price of the good of Firm B is derived as follows.
𝑝𝐵 =
(1 − 𝑏)𝑎 + (1 + 𝑏)𝑐
2 .
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Then, the equilibrium price of the good of Firm A and the equilibrium output of
Firm B are
𝑝𝐴 =
(1 − 𝑏)𝑎 + (1 + 𝑏)𝑐
2 ,
and
𝑥𝐵 =
𝑎 − 𝑐
2 .
Therefore
𝑥𝐴 = 𝑥𝐵 and 𝑝𝐴 = 𝑝𝐵.
The equilibrium proﬁts of the ﬁrms are obtained as follows,
𝜋∗𝐴 = 𝜋∗𝐵 =
(1 − 𝑏)(𝑎 − 𝑐)2
4 .
4.2 Price-price competition
Assume that both ﬁrms choose the price as their strategic variables. The relative
proﬁts of Firm A and B are
Π𝐴 =
1
1 − 𝑏2 [(1 − 𝑏)𝑎 − 𝑝𝐴 + 𝑏𝑝𝐵](𝑝𝐴 − 𝑐) −
1
1 − 𝑏2 [(1 − 𝑏)𝑎 − 𝑝𝐵 + 𝑏𝑝𝐴](𝑝𝐵 − 𝑐),
and
Π𝐵 =
1
1 − 𝑏2 [(1 − 𝑏)𝑎 − 𝑝𝐵 + 𝑏𝑝𝐴](𝑝𝐵 − 𝑐) −
1
1 − 𝑏2 [(1 − 𝑏)𝑎 − 𝑝𝐴 + 𝑏𝑝𝐵](𝑝𝐴 − 𝑐).
The conditions for relative proﬁt maximization of Firm A and B are
(1 − 𝑏)𝑎 − 2𝑝𝐴 + (1 + 𝑏)𝑐 = 0.
and
(1 − 𝑏)𝑎 − 2𝑝𝐵 + (1 + 𝑏)𝑐 = 0.
Then, the equilibrium prices and outputs are
𝑝𝐴 = 𝑝𝐵 =
(1 − 𝑏)𝑎 + (1 + 𝑏)𝑐
2 ,
and
𝑥𝐴 = 𝑥𝐵 =
𝑎 − 𝑐
2 .
The equilibrium proﬁts of the ﬁrms are
̂𝜋𝐴 = ̂𝜋𝐵 =
(1 − 𝑏)(𝑎 − 𝑐)2
4 .
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4.3 Quantity-quantity competition
Assume that both ﬁrms choose the quantity as their strategic variables. The relative
proﬁts of Firm A and B are
Π𝐴 = (𝑎 − 𝑥𝐴 − 𝑏𝑥𝐵)𝑥𝐴 − 𝑐𝑥𝐴 − [(𝑎 − 𝑥𝐵 − 𝑏𝑥𝐴)𝑥𝐵 − 𝑐𝑥𝐵],
and
Π𝐵 = (𝑎 − 𝑥𝐵 − 𝑏𝑥𝐴)𝑥𝐵 − 𝑐𝑥𝐵 − [(𝑎 − 𝑥𝐴 − 𝑏𝑥𝐵)𝑥𝐴 − 𝑐𝑥𝐴].
The conditions for proﬁt maximization of Firm A and B are
𝑎 − 2𝑥𝐴 − 𝑐 = 0,
and
𝑎 − 2𝑥𝐵 − 𝑐 = 0.
Then, the equilibrium outputs and prices are
𝑥𝐴 = 𝑥𝐵 =
𝑎 − 𝑐
2 ,
and
𝑝𝐴 = 𝑝𝐵 =
(1 − 𝑏)𝑎 + (1 + 𝑏)𝑐
2 .
The equilibrium proﬁts of the ﬁrms are
̄𝜋𝐴 = ̄𝜋𝐵 =
(1 − 𝑏)(𝑎 − 𝑐)2
4 .
4.4 Choice of strategic variables
From the arguments in the previous subsections we ﬁnd that the equilibrium prices
of the good of each ﬁrm in all four situations (price setting ﬁrm in price-quantity
competition, quantity setting ﬁrm in price-quantity competition, price-price com-
petition and quantity-quantity competition) are equal, the equilibrium outputs and
the equilibrium proﬁts of each ﬁrm in all situations are also equal.
Thus, any combination of strategy choice in the ﬁrst stage of the game consti-
tutes a sub-game perfect equilibrium in the two stage game.
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Note for a homogeneous good The equilibrium when ﬁrms produce a homoge-
nous good is deﬁned as a limit of the previous results as 𝑏 approaches to 1. Then,
we have
𝑝𝐴 ⟶ 𝑐, and 𝑝𝐵 ⟶ 𝑐,
in each case. Thus, the equilibrium price in a homogeneous good case is equal to
the equilibrium price in the perfectly competitive economy.
5 Concluding Remarks
From the results of the previous sections we get the following conclusion.
In a two stage game of duopoly with the choice of strategic variables,
price or quantity, and the choice of the levels of strategic variables,
when the ﬁrms maximize their relative proﬁts, the equilibrium out-
comes (prices, outputs and proﬁts) in all situations are equal. Thus,
any combination of strategy choice by the ﬁrms constitutes a sub-game
perfect equilibrium in the two stage game.
Assuming that ﬁrms seek to maximize some weighted average of absolute and
relative proﬁts may be more realistic. In this paper, however, we have presented
striking results under the assumption of genuine relative proﬁt maximization.
We plan to research generalizations of the results of this paper to a duopoly
with general demand and cost functions, and to an oligopoly.
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